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IN THE SUPREME COURT OF THE STATE OF UTAH
STATE OF UTAH,

:

Appellant/Respondent,

:

v.

:

RYAN WAYNE JOHNSON,

:

Appellee/Petitioner,

Case No. 20050599-SC
20040552-CA

:

ISSUE PRESENTED FOR APPEAL
"Whether a concealed gesture of a hand in a pocket is sufficient to meet the
criteria for aggravated robbery under Utah Code Ann. § 76-6-302." See Order in
Addendum A.
STANDARD OF REVIEW
This Court reviews the decision of the court of appeals for correctness. See In re
A.T.. 2001 UT 82, If 5, 34 P.3d 228. The court of appeals reviewed the trial court's
statutory interpretation for correctness. State v. Ireland. 2005 UT App 209, U 6, 113 P.3d
1028 (citing State v. Pixton, 2004 UT App 275,14, 98 P.3d 433).
OPINION BELOW
The court of appeals' decision in State v. Johnson. 2005 UT App 210
(Memorandum Decision) is in Addendum B. A copy of the companion case, State v.
Ireland, 2005 UT App 209 in Addendum C.

JURISDICTION AND NATURE OF THE PROCEEDINGS
This Court granted certiorari review of the Court of Appeals' decision on the issue
set forth above. See Order in Addendum A. This Court has jurisdiction pursuant to Utah
Code Ann. § 78-2-2(3) (2002).

TEXT OF RELEVANT STATUTES
The texts of the following statutes are in Addendum D:
Utah Code Ann. § 76-6-302 (2003);
Utah Code Ann. § 76-1-601(5) (2003).
STATEMENT OF THE CASE
In an Information filed January 9, 2004, the State charged Appellee Ryan W.
Johnson ("Appellee" or "Mr. Johnson") with four counts of aggravated robbery, first
degree felonies, in violation of Utah Code Ann. §76-6-302 (2003).1 R.l: 6-9. Another
Information was filed on the same day charging Mr. Johnson with two additional counts
of aggravated robbery, first degree felonies. R.2: 6-8. Following bind-over (R. 173), Mr.
Johnson filed a memorandum in support of a motion to reduce the six counts of
aggravated robbery to second degree felonies. R.1: 135-139. After the State responded
(R.l: 140-146; R.2: 35-41, 44-50), the trial court held a hearing on the motion on May
19, 2004. R. 174. The trial court granted the motion and entered its Findings of Fact and
Conclusions of Law on July 1,2004. R.1: 167-172; R.2: 58-63; 173:15-16.

!

The Information incorrectly cites aggravated robbery as a violation of Utah Code
Ann. §76-6-301. R.l:6-9
2

On June 22, 2004, the State filed a petition for interlocutory appeal with the Utah
Supreme Court. R.l: 163. On June 28, 2004, the Supreme Court transferred the
interlocutory appeal to the court of appeals for disposition. R.l: 165 -166.
On appeal, the court of appeals reversed the trial court, holding that it erred in
reducing five counts of aggravated robbery to simple robbery. See Johnson, 2005 UT
App 210 at 115. The court of appeals affirmed the trial court's decision to reduce one
count of aggravated robbery to simple robbery. Id.
STATEMENT OF THE FACTS
Two different Informations filed on January 9, 2004, charged Mr. Johnson with a
total of six counts of aggravated robbery. R.l: 6-9; R.2: 6-8 . The Informations allege
that Mr. Johnson was the individual responsible for these crimes which occurred in
December 2003 and January 2004. R.l. 6-9: R.2: 6-8. The following facts are taken
from the preliminary hearing held on February 10, 2004. R. 173.
Case No. 041900176
Count I: On December 21, 2003, Lisa Ovard, store manager, was working at the
Sinclair gas station on 3310 South and 700 East in Salt Lake City. R. 173:9. "A
gentleman came in with his head wrapped up in a white T-shirt and walked up to the
counter." R. 173:9. Ovard thought the man was wearing the T-shirt around his head
because it was cold outside. R. 173:10. The man had his right hand in his front coat
pocket. R. 173:11. With his right hand in his pocket, the man placed his hand on the
counter pointing it towards Ovard and placed a "Spitz Sunflower Seed bag on the
counter" and asked Ovard to "put the money in the bag." R. 173:10. Ovard asked the
3

man if he wanted the change also. R. 173:11, The man replied that he wanted the
quarters. R. 173:11. Ovard did not see anything in the man's hand. R. 173:13. Ovard
thought the object in the coat pocket "was either a gun or a finger." R. 173:14. The man
did not make any motions with his hand such as moving his arm up and down. R.
173:14. Although Ovard did not know if he had a gun she testified that she was afraid for
her life. R. 173:11. The man did not say that he had a gun, did not make any threatening
gestures, and did not threaten Ovard that he was going to harm her in any way. R.
173:15-16.
Count II: On December 22, 2003, Cynthia West, was working as a cashier at
Phillips 66 on 315 East and 3900 South in Salt Lake City. R. 173:17. While West was
changing the coffee filters, a man came in wearing a scarf over his face. R. 173:17. The
man handed West a bag that West thought he wanted to have thrown away. R. 173:18.
The man told West to "Fill it" with money. R. 173:18, 21. West noticed that man had his
right hand in his pocket of his sweatshirt which looked like he had a gun. R. 173:18. The
man raised up his hand in his pocket about waist high with his index finger extended. R.
173:23. The man did not point it at her. R. 173:24. West told police that she "didn't
know whether it was his finger or a Tootsie Roll or a gun." R. 173:19, 23. Although, the
man did not tell West he had a gun, did not make any threats, and did not make any
aggressive motions towards her, West testified that she feared for her life. R. 173:19, 23.
West opened up the register and gave the man all the cash and asked him if he wanted all
the coins as well. R. 173:18. The man said he wanted the quarters. R. 173:19. West
then said "Here's a couple of gold dollars for you, too." R. 173:19. West then asked if
4

she could get the man anything else and he said "No, that's all I need." R. 173:19. West
then said "Alrighty then, you have a good day." R. 173:19.
Count III: On December 23, 2003, Jennifer Forsgren worked as a cashier at
Tesoro on 1200 West and 3900 South in Salt Lake City. R. 173:27. A man came into the
store with a scarf wrapped around his head covering his face except for his eyes. R.
173:28. Because it was cold outside, Forsgren did not think anything of it. R. 173:28.
The man put a bag on the counter and said "Put the money in the bag." R. 173:29. The
man had his right hand in his pocket and Forsgren assumed he had a gun. R. 173:29.
However, the man did not have any of his fingers protruding in his pocket and did not
raise it up in any manner. R. 173:32. The man just kind of stood there with his hand
resting in his pocket. R. 173:32. Forsgren put the money in the bag and gave it to the
man. R. 173:29. The man never said he had a gun or a weapon of any kind. R. 173:32.
The man did not threaten Forsgren or move towards her in any threatening manner. R.
173:32. Even though it was cold outside, Forsgren assumed he had a gun because he had
his hand resting inside his pocket. R. 173:33.
Count IV: On December 24, 2003, Allan Cantonwine was working as a clerk at
Phillips 66 on 315 East and 3900 South in Salt Lake City. R. 173:35. As he came in for
work, his co-worker, Myeong-Ock Kim, asked him "How do you open the register?" R.
173:35. There was a man with a thick jacket on and a white scarf over his face behind
the counter with Kim. R. 173:35, 42. There was a baggy sitting on the counter and the
man told Cantonwine to put the money in the bag. R. 173:37. Cantonwine put the
money in the bag because he received training while working at 7-eleven to "always do
5

what you're told." R. 173:37. Cantonwine noticed that the man had his hand in his
pocket with a finger extended. R. 173:37. Cantonwine testified that it could have been a
candy bar, a finger, or a gun. R. 173:37. However, if it was a gun, he "didn't want him to
shoot [Cantonwine]. If it was his finger, [Cantonwine] didn't care. [He] was just going to
do what [he] was told." R. 173:38. The man never said he had a gun, never told
Cantonwine that he would be harmed, and did not make any verbal threats at all. R.
173:44.
Case No, 041900182
Count I : On January 6, 2004, Julie Valdez was employed at A Appliance &
Refrigeration on 501 East and 2700 South in Salt Lake City. R. 173:60. A man came in
and Valdez asked him if she could help him. R. 173:61. The man said "Give me your
money." R. 173:61. The man "protruded whatever he had in his pocket." R. 173:63.
"Whether it was a gun or not, [Valdez did not] know." R. 173:63. Valdez testified that
she "didn't think he [had a gun] because the bulge wasn't big enough." R. 173:66.
Valdez told the man that she "didn't have any" money. R. 173:62. The man said "yes,
you do." R. 173:62. Valdez told the man that she didn't keep money there and asked the
man if he saw a cash register around. R. 173:62. The man thought the microfiche
equipment was a register. R. 173:62. Valdez told the man that it was a microfiche
machine and again stated that she did not have any cash. R. 173:62. The man looked at
Valdez and asked as if he had given up "you don't have even $20?" R. 173:62. Valdez
2

. The state does not challenge the appellate court's affirmance of the trial court's ruling
that Count I in the January 2004 incident constituted a robbery rather an aggravated
robbery. Johnson, 2005 UT App 210 at ^[5
6

said "no. I told you, I don't have any money." R. 173:62. The man then turned and left.
R. 173:62. Valdez testified that the man never said he had a gun and never threaten her.
R. 173:66. Valdez testified that the man "was very nice-spoken, soft-spoken, not
aggressive, not anything that would make you think that he was going to cause you harm.
He was a nice-spoken young man." R. 173:66.
Count II: On January 6, 2004, Ester Cho was working at her store, Young's Food
Mart, on 1249 South 900 East in Salt Lake City. R. 173:69. A man came into the store
and walked up to the counter with his hand pointed in his pocket and asked Cho for
money. R. 173:70. Cho "didn't know exactly what it was [in the man's pocket] but it
scared" her. R. 173:71. Although Cho had more money in the register, she gave him $20
and told the man he was "committing a crime." R. 173:71, 72. The man responded that
he would pay her back and then left the store. R. 173:71. The man did not tell Cho he
had a gun and did not say anything threatening towards her. R. 173:72-73.
At the conclusion of the preliminary hearing, the trial court bound Mr. Johnson
over on all six felony counts of aggravated robbery. R. 30-31; 173:87; R.2: 28-29. On
May 3, 2004, Mr. Johnson filed a motion to reduce Counts I through IV in Case No.
041900176 and Counts I and II in Case No. 041099182 to second degree felonies. Rl.
135-139. On May 13, 2004 the State filed a memorandum in opposition to Mr. Johnson's
motion. R.1: 140-146; R.2: 35-41, 44-50. On May 19, 2004, the trial court held a
hearing on Mr. Johnson's motion to reduce all six counts from aggravated robberies to
simple robberies. R. 174. At the conclusion of the hearing, the trial court granted Mr.
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Johnson's motion finding that under the facts of this case, more is required to show
aggravated robbery than just a hand in the pocket. R. 174:16.
The State filed a petition for interlocutory appeal with the Utah Supreme Court.
R. 163. On June 28, 2004, the Supreme Court transferred the interlocutory appeal to the
court of appeals for disposition. R. 165. On May 12, 2005, the court of appeals issued its
memorandum decision reversing the trial court's decision on five of the six counts. See
Johnson, 2005 UT App 210 at | 5 . In reversing the trial court's decision, Ihe court of
appeals relied on its opinion issued the same day in the identical case State v. Ireland,
2005 UT App 209. See Johnson, 2005 UT App 210 at lf3.
SUMMARY OF THE ARGUMENT
In order to elevate a robbery to an aggravated robbery, Utah's statutory scheme
requires more than the use or threatened use of a facsimile or representation of a
dangerous weapon Utah Code Ann. § 76-l-601(5)(6). The legislature defined dangerous
weapon for the purposes of aggravated robbery as not only a representation or facsimile
of a dangerous weapon, but in addition, that the representation or facsimile be used in a
way that leads the victim to reasonably believe that it is likely to cause death or, in the
alternative, that the actor represents that he is in control of a dangerous weapon. In order
to give meaning to all of the words in the statute and preclude subsections (i) and (ii)
from being superfluous, a robber must do something in addition to using or threatening to
use a facsimile or representation. Even if a concealed hand in the pocket qualifies as a
representation under the first part of the statute, a further representation, verbal or
otherwise, that the robber will use the gun or objective facts that make it reasonable to
8

believe that the item is likely to cause death is required in order to elevate the crime to
aggravated robber. A concealed gesture in a pocket does not meet this definition.
ARGUMENT
POINT. A CONCEALED GESTURE OF A HAND IN A POCKET IS NOT
SUFFICIENT TO MEET THE CRITERIA FOR AGGRAVATED
ROBBERY UNDER UTAH CODE ANN. S 76-6-302
The only issue throughout this case has been whether Petitioner committed the
crime of simple or aggravated robbery when he made a concealed gesture with his hand
in his pocket but made no verbal or other representation that he had a dangerous weapon
or that he would use a weapon as part of the robbery. The relevant statutes require that in
order to use or threaten to use a dangerous weapon so as to elevate a crime from simple to
aggravated robbery, a person must use or threaten to use a facsimile or representation of a
weapon and must further represent that he is in control of a dangerous weapon Utah Code
Ann. § 76-l-601(5)(6) Since gesturing with a hand in a pocket fails to meet these
requirements, a concealed gesture of a hand is not sufficient to elevate a robbery from a
simple to aggravated robbery.
This Court's primary goal in interpreting statutes "is to evince 'the true intent and
purpose of the Legislature.'" State v. Maestas, 2002 UT 123,1J52, 63 P.3d 621 (citation
omitted). Accordingly, this Court looks to the plain language of the statute which
provides the Court "with the road map to the statute's meaning." Id. "[T]he plain
language of the statute [is read] as a whole, and . . . its provisions [are interpreted] . . . in
harmony with other statutes in the same chapter and related chapters." Miller v. Weaver,
2003 UT 12, ^jl7, 66 P.3d 592 (citation omitted). Words in a statute that have a
9

commonly accepted meaning should be given that common, lay meaning unless there is
an indication that the legislature intended otherwise. Travelers/Aetna Ins. Co. v. Wilson,
2002 UT App 221, ^[12, 51 P.3d 1288. The Court's purpose in interpreting the statute is
"'to render all parts . . . relevant and meaningful,' and [this Court] presume[s] the
legislature used each term advisedly and . .. according to its ordinary meaning.'"
Maestas, 2002 UT 123 at f 52 (citations omitted).
Utah Code Ann. § 76-6-301 (2003) outlines the elements for simple robbery.
Pursuant to that provision, a person commits a simple robbery if s/he uses force or fear to
take personal property from another or uses force or fear against another in the course of
committing a theft. Id- Utah Code Ann. § 76-6-301 provides:
(1) A person commits robbery if:
(a) the person unlawfully and intentionally takes or attempts to take
personal property in the possession of another from his person, or immediate
presence, against his will, by means of force or fear; or
(b)The person intentionally or knowingly uses force or fear of immediate
force against another in the course of committing a theft.
(2) An act shall be considered "in the course of committing a theft" if it occurs in
an attempt to commit theft, commission of theft, or in the immediate flight
after the attempt or commission.
(3) Robbery is a felony of the second degree.
Utah Code Ann. § 76-6-301. This provision demonstrates that all robberies, regardless of
whether a dangerous weapon is used, require that force or fear be used against the victim.
A robbery is elevated to an aggravated robbery when the robber uses or threatens
to use a dangerous weapon. Utah Code Ann. § 76-6-302 (2003) outlines the elements for
aggravated robbery, stating in relevant part that "[a] person commits aggravated robbery
if in the course of committing a robbery, he: [ ] uses or threatens to use a dangerous
10

weapon as defined in Section 76-1-601." Utah Code Ann. § 76-6-302 (2003). Pursuant
to this provision, a robbery is elevated to an aggravated robbery when the robber not only
uses force or fear, as required for robbery, but also uses or threatens to use a dangerous
weapon as defined in Utah Code Ann. § 76-1-601 (5) (2003).
Whether a robber has used or threatened to use a dangerous weapon is controlled
by Utah Code Ann. § 76-1-601 (5) (2003) which defines "dangerous weapon." Pursuant
to this provision:
(5) "Dangerous weapon" means:
(a) any item capable of causing death or serious bodily injury; or
(b) a facsimile or representation of the item; and
(i)
the actor's use or apparent intended use of the item leads the victim
to reasonably believe the item is likely to cause death or serious
bodily injury; or
(ii)
the actor represents to the victim verbally or in any other manner
that he is in control of such an item.
Utah Code Ann. § 76-1-601(5).
Under the predecessor to these statutes, a defendant did not commit aggravated
robbery when he held his hand in his pocket up over the counter pointing at the victim as
if it were a gun and threatened to "blast" people if they did not cooperate. State v.
Suniville, 741 P.2d 961, 962 (Utah 1987). This Court concluded that the defendant's
menacing gesture with his hand in his pocket, coupled with a verbal threat to shoot did
not elevate the crime to an aggravated robbery in Suniville because the version of the
statute then in effect defined aggravated robbery as a robbery where the perpetrator used
"a firearm or facsimile of a firearm." Id. Because Suniville did not use a weapon or a
replica of a weapon and his "menacing gesture accompanied by verbal threats" did not
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establish use of a firearm, this Court held that Suniville committed the crime of simple
robbery when he made those gestures with his hand in his pocket and threatened to
"blast" people. Id. at 965.
In reaching its decision in Suniville, this Court was careful maintain the distinction
between robbery and aggravated robbery. Id. This Court recognized that all robberies
involve force or fear, but that robbery is elevated to an aggravated robbery not because it
generates fear but because, as required by the then applicable language, the robber used a
weapon or a facsimile thereof. Id. at 964-65. This Court concluded that it "must observe
[the] critical distinction between robbery and aggravated robbery where the evidence is
only of verbal threats and intimidating gestures" in order to ensure that a distinction
exists between simple and aggravated robbery. Id. at 965. This Court concluded that
Suniville5s "menacing gesture accompanied by verbal threats is not sufficient evidence
alone to establish the use of a firearm or a facsimile of a firearm. To hold otherwise
would pervert the language of section 76-6-302 and erode the statutory distinction
between robbery and aggravated robbery." Id.
Williams v. Commonwealth, 721 S.W.2d 710 (Ky. 1986), relied upon by this
Court in Suniville, 741 P.2d at 965, likewise recognized that because the threat of
physical harm exists in all robberies, something more than such a threat must be used to
elevate a crime from simple to aggravated robbery. Williams, 721 S.W.2d at 711-713. A
threat to kill someone accompanied by the defendant reaching toward his back pocket
was not enough to elevate the crime to an aggravated robbery in Williams because the
robber did not represent an instrument, and labeling the crime as an aggravated robbery
12

under the circumstances would blur the distinction between simple and aggravated
robbery. Id. at 711. Although the victim in Williams believed that the defendant might
have a weapon, the court rejected the aggravated robbery charge because a threat of harm
also exists when a simple robbery occurs and the two charges must be distinguished by
something other than the threat of physical harm. Id.
The Commonwealth supports the conviction by asserting: "It is not fatal that
Appellant threatened with an unseen weapon or instrument... . The culpability
of the defendant's intent is manifested by his threat of physical harm and danger to
the victim exists from the response to fear he perceives as reasonable." This,
however, does not distinguish it from second degree robbery in which the threat of
physical force is the gravamen. A response of perceiving danger is quite real
under threat; however, such cannot serve to convert something merely speculated
upon (a weapon or instrument) into established existence.
Id. at 712.
Additionally, the Williams court recognized that the victim's response to a threat
cannot define the nature of the crime and a victim's speculation that there might be a
weapon does not support an aggravated robbery charge. Id. This is so because the
degree of the crime would be left to the subjective response of the victim rather than the
actions of the perpetrator, and there would be no objective guidelines for an aggravated
robbery charge. Id. Although the victim in Williams believed that the defendant might
have had a weapon, the court rejected the aggravated robbery charge in part because the
determination of whether a robbery is aggravated cannot be defined by the reaction of the
victim.
To do otherwise places defendant virtually without defense at the caprice of
a victim's subjective evaluation without regard to the actual course of
events and could lead to convictions for crimes neither intended nor
enacted. Our heritage of justice applies the law to the facts. Herein the fact
13

is that although force was threatened, the presence of a weapon or
instrument was illusory at best. Without an instrument's ever being seen,
an intimidating threat, albeit coupled with a menacing gesture cannot
suffice to meet the standard necessary for a first degree robbery conviction.
Id. (emphasis added).
While the statutory language changed following Suniville, the concerns expressed
in Suniville and Williams that the statute must draw a clear distinction between simple
and aggravated robbery remain. The actions necessary to elevate a robbery to an
aggravated robbery cannot be left to the subjective reaction of the victim and instead
must be guided by a statutory definition that provides a workable distinction between
simple and aggravated robbery. Otherwise, the aggravated robbery statute would be
applied inconsistently based on the predilections and emotions of victims and defendant
would be left without a means for defending against the elevation. See Suniville, 721
P.2dat965; Williams, 721 P.2d at 711-12; see also People v. Taylor, 628 N.W.2d 55
(Mich. App. 2001) (applying objective approach when determining whether victim
reasonably believed defendant was armed).
Following Suniville, the Utah legislature amended the aggravated robbery
statutory scheme. Whereas the pre-Suniville aggravated robbery statute allowed a
robbery to be elevated only when the robber used or threatened to use a firearm or knife
or a facsimile thereof, the post-Suniville statute expanded the definition of dangerous
weapon to include circumstances where a defendant uses or threatens to use a facsimile
or representation, coupled with a further representation or use so as to justify elevating

14

the charge to an aggravated robbery. Utah Code Ann. § 76-l-601(5)(b) (1989); compare
Utah Code Ann. § 76-1-601 (5)(b) (2003).
While use of an actual weapon qualifies as a dangerous weapon, Utah Code Ann.
§ 76-l-601(5)(b) also defines a dangerous weapon as "a facsimile or representation of an
item; and (i) use or apparent use of that item in a manner that leads the victim to
reasonably believe that the item is capable of causing serious injury or death or (ii) a
representation verbally or in any other manner that the robber is in control of a dangerous
weapon. Utah Code Ann. § 76-l-601(5)(b) (emphasis added). Under the plain language
of this statute, in order to elevate a simple robbery based on use of a dangerous weapon,
the robber must not only use or threaten to use a facsimile or representation of a weapon,
but must also do something further to lead the victim to reasonably believe that he has a
dangerous weapon or to represent that he has control of a dangerous weapon. The choice
of the word "and" demonstrates that this statute requires not just a facsimile or
representation but also something in addition which would make it reasonable to elevate
the crime even though an actual weapon was not used. See generally Travelers/Aetna
Ins. Co., 2002 UT App 221 at ^| 12 (words should be given their commonly accepted
meaning).
The statute also outlines the "something further" that is required, supplying two
alternatives, either of which will elevate the use or threatened use of a facsimile or
representation to an aggravated robbery. First, if the robber uses an item that is a
facsimile or representation of an item capable of causing death or serious bodily injury in
a manner that leads the victim to reasonably believe that the item is likely to cause such
15

injury or death, the crime is elevated to an aggravated robbery. Because of the concerns
about defining a crime based on the subjective response of victims, the belief that the
item is likely to cause death or serious bodily injury should be objectively reasonable.
See e.g. Williams, 721 S.W.2d at 711; Taylor, 628 N.W.2d at 59. Alternatively, when a
robber uses or threatens use of a facsimile or representation of a dangerous weapon, the
crime can also be elevated when the robber represents verbally or in some other manner
that he is in control of a dangerous weapon. These alternative requirements added onto
the use of a facsimile or representation demonstrate that the additional requirements must
be met in order to elevate the crime to a first degree felony.
The timing of the amendment and its language suggest that the legislature meant
to encompass the circumstances of Suniville so that they would qualify as an aggravated
robbery under the amended statute. Applying the amended statute to Suniville's actions,
the menacing gesture would arguably fit within the first part of the statute as a
"representation of an item," while the verbal representation by Suniville that he would
use the item to cause death or serious bodily injury satisfied the second part. In other
words, under the amended version of the statute, Suniville's actions would qualify as an
aggravated robbery because he not only threatened use of a "representation" but, in
addition, he further verbally represented that he would use a gun to "blast" people. See
generally Suniville, 741 P.2d at 765 (outlining facts).
While the legislature apparently intended to incorporate the Suniville facts into the
definition of aggravated robbery, it nevertheless took care to draw a distinction between
simple and aggravated robbery and to require more than simply a "representation" of an
16

item in order to elevate the crime. This is evident since the legislature did not simply
amend the statute to include use or threatened use of a "representation" along with a
"facsimile" as items that would elevate the crime. Instead, the legislature expanded the
definition of dangerous weapon to include a "representation," but also required, in
addition, one of the further circumstances outlined in section 76-l-601(5)(b)(i) and (ii).
Utah Code Ann. § 76-1-601(5). Because this Court must render all parts of the statute
relevant and meaningful and presume that the legislature carefully chose its terms, it must
presume that subsection (i) and (ii) play a role in this statute. Interpreting the dangerous
weapon definition to require only a "representation" of a dangerous weapon without
imposing the additional requirements of (i) or (ii) would render those subsections as well
as the word "and" meaningless and superfluous. Accordingly, in interpreting the
dangerous weapon statute, this court should require not only a representation of a
dangerous weapon but also something further that fits within the requirements of one of
these subsections.
This Court's decision in State v. Hartmann, 783 P.2d 544, 546 (Utah 1989) is
consistent with this requirement that something more than a single representation of a
dangerous weapon is required to elevate a robbery to an aggravated robbery. In that case,
this Court interpreted section 76-l-601(5)(b) in the context of an aggravated sexual
assault conviction and held that a defendant's statement "that he had a gun and would use
it to blow [the victims'] heads off if they came down the hall during the attack" qualified •
as threatened use of a dangerous weapon. Id. This Court defined a threat as "the
expression of an intention to inflict injury on another" and recognized that "[tjhreats may
17

be communicated by action or conduct as well as by words." Id. (further citations
omitted). While this Court rejected Hartmann's claim that verbal threat was not enough
to find use of a dangerous weapon, the facts in Hartmann nevertheless show both a verbal
representation by the defendant that he has a gun and, in addition, a verbal representation
that he would use that gun. Id. at 545. This is consistent with the language of Utah
Code Ann. § 76-1-601 which requires more than simply a representation of a dangerous
weapon.
The court of appeals has also required both the use or threatened use of a facsimile
or representation and either use that leads to a reasonable belief that the item can cause
death or serious bodily injury or a representation by the robber that he is in control of an
item that can cause death or serious bodily injury. See e ^ State v. Adams, 830 P.2d 310,
312 (Utah 1992) (robber who told victim he would shoot her if she called police and put
hand on bulging pocket, led victim "to believe he had a gun and reasonably fear for her
physical safety"); State v. Candelario, 909 P.2d 277 (Utah App. 1995) (claim by robber
that he had a gun and threat to use it elevated crime to aggravated robbery).
In Candelario, the court of appeals concluded that a representation under the first
part of the dangerous weapon statute includes both physical and verbal "representations."
Id. at 278. In reaching this decision, the court indicated that "representation" "is an
expansive term, and, while it can mean 'a likeness, picture, model, or other reproduction,5
it can also refer to 'a statement or account especially made to convey . . . [an] impression
of something with the intention of

. . . influencing action.'" Id. (quoting Webster's

Third New Int'l. Dictionary 1926 (1986)). Consistent with Hartmann, the court of
18

appeals concluded in Candelario that a verbal representation that a robber has a gun
meets the first part of the definition for dangerous weapon found in section 76-1-601(5).
Moreover, while the robber's claim that he had a gun was a representation that met the
first part of the statute, his indication that he would kill the cashier met the second
requirement because the robber verbally represented that he was in control of and would
use a dangerous weapon. Candelario, 909 P.2d at 278; see also Utah Code Ann. § 76-1601(5)(b). Under these circumstances, the determination of whether a gun was involved
was based on meeting the two aspects of the definition set forth in section 76-l-601(5)(b)
and was not left to the subjective reaction of the victim.
The court of appeals also analyzed whether a crime was elevated to an aggravated
robbery by the use or threatened use of a dangerous weapon in State v. Reyos, 2004 UT
App 151, 91 P.3d 861 and Adams, 830 P.2d 310. That court did not look to the
subjective reaction of the victim in either of those cases and instead concluded that the
defendant had used or threatened to use a dangerous weapon when he verbally
represented that he had a gun and either put his hand on a bulging pocket or further
represented that he would use the gun to "shoot to kill." Reyos, 2004 UT App 151 at ^4;
see also Adams, 830 P.2d at 313. Since the defendant in both Reyos and Adams did
something more than simply use or threaten to use a facsimile or representation of an
item, the court of appeals concluded that the circumstances in those cases met the
definition of dangerous weapon.
Requiring a representation of a dangerous weapon coupled with something further
in order to elevate a robbery to an aggravated robbery is consistent with the line drawn by
19

the Michigan courts between robbery and aggravated robbery. The Michigan statute,
which is similar but not identical to Utah's, elevates a robbery to aggravated robbery
when a robber is "armed with a dangerous weapon, or any article used or fashioned in a
manner to lead the person so assaulted to reasonably believe it to be a dangerous
weapon." Taylor, 628 N.W.2d at 57 (quoting Mich. Comp. Laws § 750.529; Mich. Stat.
Ann. § 28.797). In feigned weapon cases, the Michigan courts have required an
objectively reasonable belief that the robber is armed and have drawn "an absolute
minimum level of evidence sufficient to support an armed robbery conviction." People v.
Banks, 563 N.W.2d 200, 202 (Mich. 1997) (citing People v. Jolly, 502 N.W.2d 177, 182
(Mich. 1993)).
The "absolute minimum" necessary for a robbery to be aggravated is found in
Jolly where there was a verbal threat that the robber would shoot if the victim did not
comply and a bulge in the robber's vest where a gun could be concealed. Jolly, 502
N.W.2d at 182. On the other hand, a hand in the pocket during a robbery which the
robber moved around was not sufficient to elevate a robbery to an aggravated robbery.
Banks, 563 N.W.2d at 202-05. The distinction made by the Michigan courts offers a
workable approach to preserving the distinction between robbery and aggravate robbery
under the language of Utah's statute.
Rather than requiring a representation of an item and a further representation that
the item would be used to harm the victim or otherwise fit within the second aspect of the
dangerous weapon definition, the court of appeals interpreted the dangerous weapon
definition to require only that the defendant make a representation that he had an item,
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which according to the court of appeals, was accomplished by a pointed finger in a
pocket. Ireland, 2005 UT App 209, Hf7-13.3 Moreover, by allowing the subjective
reaction of the victim to play a role in determining whether a defendant committed a
simple or aggravated robbery, the court of appeals disregarded this Court's concerns in
Suniville and opened the door for inconsistent application of the aggravated robbery
statute based in part on a victim's predisposition for anxiety, fear or embellishment rather
than the objective conduct of the robber. See id. Because the language of Utah's statute
requires more than a representation of a weapon, the court of appeals' analysis should be
rejected. Moreover, in order to consistently apply the aggravated robbery statute ad
avoid defining aggravated robbery based on based on the emotions or sensitivities of the
victim, this Court should reject the court of appeals' conclusion that the subjective
response of the victim plays a role in defining aggravated robbery.
A concealed gesture of a hand in a pocket fails to meet the definitional
requirements of section 76-l-601(5)(b). Even if the gesture fits the first part of the
In reaching its decision that section 76-1-601 requires only a representation of an item,
the court of appeals listed several cases that elevated a robbery to an aggravated robbery
when a defendant represented a simulated weapon. See Ireland, 2005 UT App 209 at ^[10
n. 1. Those cases are not persuasive since the statutes at issue in those cases contain
different language and do not have the two part requirement set forth in Utah Code Ann.
§ 76-1-601(5). For example, the statute at issue in State v. Lawrence, No. 9706017912,
2001 Del. Super. LEXIS 318, at *7 (Del. Super. Ct. Aug. 28, 2001) required "that
Defendant display[ ] what appear[s] to be a deadly weapon." Id.; see also State v.
Ellison, 819 P.2d 1010 (Ariz. 1991) (to elevate to aggravated robbery, statute requires
that defendant use a simulated dangerous weapon); DeLeon v. State, No. CACR 89-118,
1989 Ark. App. LEXIS 608, at *3 (Ark. Ct. App. Dec. 6, 1989) (to elevate to aggravated
robbery, statute requires that defendant be armed with a deadly weapon or represent by
word or conduct that he is so armed). Because the statutes at issue in the cases listed in
footnote 1 do not have the same definition and do not contain the two part test of section
76-1-601(5), they should not be relied upon in interpreting Utah's statute.
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definition as a representation of an item capable of causing death or serious bodily injury,
such a gesture, without more, fails to establish facts from which it is reasonable to
objectively believe that the item is likely to cause death or serious bodily injury. See
Utah Code Ann. § 76-l-601(5yb)(T); see also Taylor, 628 N.W.2d at 58-60 (indicating
that defendant must simulate a weapon and induce an objectively reasonable belief that
he is armed in order to elevate a robbery to an aggravated robbery).4 Likewise, such a
gesture fails to establish that the robber is in control of an item likely to cause death or
serious bodily injury so as to comply with section 76~l-601(5)(b)(ii). Since the language
in subsection (b)(ii) must require something more than a "representation of an item
capable of causing death or serious bodily injury," a gesture in a pocket, without more,
fails to establish that the robber represented that he was in control of an item likely to
cause death. Utah Code Ann. § 76-l-601(5)(b)(ii). Accordingly, a gesture is not
sufficient to elevate a robbery to aggravated robbery.
Because a concealed gesture does not meet both requirements of section 76-1601(5), it does not elevate a robbery to and aggravated robbery. The court of appeals'
determination to the contrary rendered the second part of the statute superfluous and
improperly included a subjective aspect to the definition. Rules of statutory construction
require that the court of appeals' definition be rejected. Accordingly, Mr. Johnson

4

Under the weapons part of Title 76, a dangerous weapon is defined as "any item that in
the manner of its use or intended use is capable of causing death." Utah Code Ann. § 7610-501(5)(a) (2003). Although this is a distinct definition, it provides guidance in
assessing whether the gesture represented a dangerous weapon and more importantly,
whether it created an objectively reasonable belief that the item was likely to cause death
or serious bodily injury or otherwise fit within section 76-l-6-l(5)(b).
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requests that this Court overturn the court of appeals' decision and require that a
representation of a dangerous weapon be coupled with one of the requirements found in
section 76-1-601 (5)(b)(i) or (ii) in order to elevate the crime to an aggravated robbery.
CONCLUSION
Appellee Ryan Johnson, by and through counsel, respectfully requests that this
Court reverse the decision of the court of appeals and hold that a concealed gesture in a
pocket is not sufficient to elevate a robbery to an aggravated robbery.
SUBMITTED this tf^day of December, 2005.

JOAN C. WATT
DEBRA M. NELSON
PATRICK L. ANDERSON
Attorneys for Defendant/Appellant
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FILED
IN THE SUPREME COURT OF THE STATE OBTAH^PPELLATE COURTS
00O00

OCT 2 h 2005
State of Utah,
Respondent,
Case No. 20050599-SC
20040522-CA

v.
Ryan Wayne Johnson,
Petitioner.

ORDER
This matter is before the court upon a Petition for Writ of
certiorari, filed on July 8, 2005.
IT IS HEREBY ORDERED, pursuant to Rule 45 of the Utah Rules
of Appellate Procedure, the Petition for Writ of Certiorari is
granted as to the following issues:
Whether a concealed gesture of a hand in a pocket is
sufficient to meet the criteria for aggravated robbery under Utah
Code Ann. § 76-6-302.
A briefing schedule will be established hereafter. Pursuant
to rule 2, the court suspends the provision of rule 26(a) that
permits the parties to stipulate to an extension of time to
submit their briefs on the merits. The parties shall not be
permitted to stipulate to an extension. Additionally, absent
extraordinary circumstances, no extensions will be granted by
motion. The parties shall comply with the briefing schedule upon
its issuance.

FOR THE COURT:

Date

/

Christine M. Durham
Chief Justice
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65 of 78 DOCUMENTS
State of Utah, Plaintiff and Appellant, v. Ryan Wayne Johnson,
Defendant and Appellee.
Case No. 20040522-CA
COURT OF APPEALS OF UTAH
2005 UTApp 210; 2005 Utah App. LEXIS 215
May 12, 2005, Filed
NOTICE: [*1]
PUBLICATION

NOT FOR OFFICIAL

PRIOR HISTORY: Third District, Salt
Lake Department, 041900176. The Honorable Leslie A. Lewis.
LexisNexis(R) Head notes

COUNSEL: Mark L. Shurtleff and Brett J.
DelPorto, Salt Lake City, for Appellant.
Patrick L. Anderson and Debra Meek Nelson, Salt Lake City, for Appellee.
JUDGES: Judith M. Billings, Presiding
Judge. WE CONCUR: James Z. Davis,
Judge, Norman H. Jackson, Judge.
OPINIONBY: Judith M. Billings
OPINION:
MEMORANDUM DECISION
Before Judges Billings, Davis, and Jackson.

BILLINGS, Presiding Judge:
The State appeals an interlocutory order
granting Defendant Ryan Wayne Johnson's
motion to reduce the charges from aggravated robbery to robbery on six counts. The
State argues that the trial court erred in interpreting the term "representation" of a
dangerous weapon in Utah Code sections
7'6-6-302 and 76-1-601 to include only verbal statements. Utah Code Ann. § § 76-6302, 76-1-601 (2004). The State avers that
Johnson's use of his hand in his pocket to
simulate a gun constitutes a nonverbal "representation" within the meaning of the Utah
Code. Johnson argues that even if we determine nonverbal statements or gestures
constitute a "representation" under the statute, the [*2] victims did not have a reasonable belief that "the item [was] likely to
cause death or serious bodily injury" as required by Utah Code section 76-1-60L nl
Id. § 76-1-601 (5)(b)(i). We reverse on five
counts and affirm on one count of the robbery charges.
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2005 UT App 210; 2005 Utah App. LEXIS 215, *

nl We review the trial court's interpretation of statutes for correctness.
See State v. Pixton, 2004 UT App 275,
P4,98P.3d433.
Johnson was charged with a total of six
counts of aggravated robbery in two separate criminal informations. Four counts allegedly occurred in December 2003 and
two counts in January 2004. Victims testified that on each occasion Johnson approached the victim and asked for money,
that Johnson had a bulge in his right pocket,
that he had his hand in his pocket, and that
something was protruding which looked
like a gun. The testimony was that Johnson
made no verbal threats nor did he tell any of
the victims that he had a gun in his possession. In addition, some of the victims testified that they complied [*3] with Johnson's
requests because they feared for their lives.
In State v. Ireland, No, 20040502-CA,
113 P.3d 1028t 2005 UT App 209 also issued today, we held that a "representation"
constitutes both verbal and nonverbal
statements or gestures. See id. at P10. Because the facts of this case are nearly identical to those of Ireland, the same reasoning
applies. Consequently, we hold that the trial
court erred in interpreting Utah Code sections 76-6-302 and 76-1-601 and that a
"representation" may be made by both verbal and nonverbal statements or gestures.
For each of the six counts of robbery, Johnson's action of holding his hand in his
pocket simulating a gun constitutes a "representation" within the meaning of Utah
Code section 76-1-60L Johnson's conduct
is sufficient to sustain aggravated robbery
charges so long as the victims "reasonably
belie[ved] the item [was] likely to cause

death or serious bodily injury." Utah Code
Ann. § 76-1-601 (5)(b)(1).
After reviewing the record on each of
the six counts, we determine that the victims had the requisite "reasonable belief to
sustain an aggravated robbery charge in all
but one of the six counts. In Ireland [*4] ,
we determined that there must be objective
conduct by the defendant coupled with the
victim's subjective apprehension to constitute a reasonable belief. See 2005 UT App
22 at PI2. In five of the counts, victims testified that they saw or assumed that Johnson
had a gun, and for that reason they complied with Johnson's request to give him
money. However, the victim in Count I, occurring in January 2004, "didn't think [that
Johnson had a gun] because the bulge wasn't big enough." Moreover, the victim stated
she thought that Johnson "was very nicespoken [ , ] . . . not aggressive, not anything
that would make you think that he was going to cause you harm." Clearly, this victim
did not have the requisite reasonable belief
that Johnson would cause "death or serious
bodily injury," and the objective facts of the
encounter reinforce this reasonable belief.
Thus, there cannot be an aggravated robbery charge for this count.
Accordingly, we reverse on the four
counts occurring in December 2003 and
Count II in January 2004 and hold that
those counts sustain an aggravated robbery
charge under Utah Code sections 76-6-302
and 76-1-60L See Utah Code Ann. §§ 766-302 [*5] , 76-1-601. We affirm Count I
in January 2004 as a robbery charge because the victim did not have the requisite
reasonable objective belief to sustain an aggravated robbery charge.
Judith M. Billings,
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Presiding Judge

James Z. Davis, Judge

WE CONCUR:

Norman H. Jackson, Judge
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IN THE UTAH COURT OF APPEALS
ooOoo
OPINION
(For Official Publication)

S t a t e of Utah,
Plaintiff and Appellee,

Case No. 20040502-CA

v.

F I L E D
(May 12, 2005)

William Joseph Ireland,
Defendant and Appellant.

2005 UT App 209

Third District, Salt Lake Department, 031908349
The Honorable Paul G. Maughan
Attorneys: Michael A. Peterson and Joan C. Watt, Salt Lake City,
for Appellant
Mark L. Shurtleff and Brett J. DelPorto, Salt Lake
City, for Appellee

Before Judges Billings, Davis, and Jackson.
BILLINGS, Presiding Judge:
1l
Defendant William Joseph Ireland (Ireland) appeals the trial
courtfs judgment convicting him of aggravated robbery under Utah
Code section 76-6-302. See Utah Code Ann. § 76-6-302 (2004). We
affirm.
BACKGROUND
1f2 On December 6, 2003, Jeffrey Reinkoester (Reinkoester)
worked as a sales person in the Fortier jewelry store in the
Gateway Plaza in Salt Lake City. Ireland entered the store
wearing a thick, puffy coat and a beanie. Reinkoester greeted
Ireland who responded, "I want you to go and get me all the money
in the cash drawer right now. I'm not kidding. Hurry." As
Ireland made this demand, he pointed at Reinkoester with his
right hand, which he kept concealed in the pocket of his coat.
Ireland's hand was held close to his right side with his elbow
extending behind him. Reinkoester observed that Ireland gestured
like he had a gun and described Ireland1s hand in his coat pocket
as "pointing at [Reinkoester]." Ireland's hand was "definitely

the conviction. The aggravated robbery statute provides that
"[a] person commits aggravated robbery if in the course of
committing a robbery, he . . . uses or threatens to use a
dangerous weapon as defined in Section 76-1-601." Utah Code Ann.
§ 76-6-302. The dangerous weapon statute defines "[d]angerous
weapon" as including a "facsimile or representation" of "any item
capable of causing death or serious bodily injury." Id. § 76-1601(5) (a) , (b) . Moreover, "the actor's use or apparent intended
use of the item [must] lead[] the victim to reasonably believe
the item is likely to cause death or serious bodily injury." Id,
§ 76-1-601(5)(b)(i).
f8
Utah courts have upheld convictions for aggravated crimes
when there has been some kind of verbal representation or threat
that the defendant possessed a dangerous weapon, even where the
defendant did not display the weapon. See State v. Hartmann, 783
P.2d 544, 547 (Utah 1989) (upholding conviction for aggravated
sexual assault where defendant raped a woman while telling her
that he had a gun); State v. Reyos, 2004 UT App 151,1(3, 91 P.3d
861 (upholding aggravated robbery conviction where defendant
yelled, "Get the gun and shoot," and "shoot to kill" during the
robbery but did not display a weapon); State v Candelario, 909
P.2d 277, 277 (Utah Ct. App. 1995) (upholding sentence
enhancement for robbery where defendant claimed to have a gun and
threatened to kill the cashier but did not display or gesture
that he had a weapon); State v. Adams, 830 P.2d 310, 311 (Utah
Ct. App. 1992) (upholding aggravated robbery conviction where
defendant verbally threatened to use a gun while putting his hand
on his bulging pocket).
H9
Ireland argues that the pointing gesture inside his coat
pocket does not constitute a "representation" because it was not
verbal. We disagree and hold that the statute does not require a
"representation" to be verbal, but rather includes nonverbal
gestures.
1(10 In Candelario, we interpreted the term "representation" in a
similar section of the Utah Code to include nonverbal actions.
909 P.2d at 278. Specifically, Utah Code section 76-3-203(2)
(the enhancement statute) provides that a sentence may be
enhanced by one year when " ! a dangerous weapon or a facsimile or
the representation of a dangerous weapon, as provided in Section
76-1-601!" is used while committing a second degree felony.
Candelario, 909 P.2d at 278 (emphasis added) (quoting Utah Code
Ann. § 76-3-203(2) (1995) (amended to what is now Utah Code Ann.
§ 76-3-203.8 (2004))). We defined "representation" as "an
expansive term," meaning "a statement conveying an impression for
the purpose of influencing action." Id. Moreover, we noted that
"[s]uch a statement can be either in the form of a verbal
assertion or nonverbal action." Id. at 278 n.2 (citing Utah R.

til Turning to the facts of this case, we determine that
Ireland's gesture of pointing his hand inside his coat pocket
close to his right side with his elbow extended constitutes a
representation of a dangerous weapon because such gesture was
intended to look like a gun for the purpose of influencing
Reinkoester to give Ireland all of the cash in the cash drawer.2
i|l2 Moreover, we determine that Reinkoester reasonably believed
that the "item [was] intended to cause death or serious bodily
injury." Utah Code Ann. § 76-1-601 (5) (b) (i) (2004). Reinkoester
testified that he feared that if he did not comply with Ireland's
request, he may be shot. Guns by their very nature are capable
of causing death or serious bodily injury. Reinkoester's belief
was based not only on the subjective belief that he thought
Ireland had a gun, but also on objective evidence. Reinkoester
saw something "pointing at [him]" inside Ireland's coat pocket.
That something "looked like a gun." This is sufficient objective
evidence to support a reasonable belief that one might have been
injured if he or she did not comply. Seef e.g., Parker v. State,
607 S.W.2d 378, 379 (Ark. 1980) (holding that victimfs subjective
apprehension coupled with defendant's objective conduct was
sufficient to sustain a conviction of aggravated robbery);
Faulkner v. State, 581 S.E.2d 365, 367 (Ga. Ct. App. 2003)
(determining that victim had "reasonable apprehension" where
defendant used his hand covered with a sock to look like a gun
and pressed it against victim's back); People v. Taylor, 628
N.W.2d 55, 61 (Mich. Ct. App. 2001) (holding there was ample
objective evidence that defendant either had a gun or simulated
2. Ireland relies heavily upon State v. Suniville, 741 P.2d 961
(Utah 1987), where the Utah Supreme Court held, under a previous
version of the aggravated robbery statute, that the defendant did
not commit aggravated robbery where he had his hand in his pocket
held up over the counter as if he had a gun, and made threats
that he would "blast" people if they did not cooperate. Id. at
962. The prior version of the aggravated robbery statute
narrowly defined aggravated robbery as where the perpetrator used
"a firearm or a facsimile of a firearm, knife or a facsimile of a
knife or a deadly weapon." Id.; Utah Code Ann. § 76-6-302
(1978). The court held that the "[d]efendant's menacing gesture
accompanied by verbal threats is not sufficient evidence alone to
establish the use of a firearm or a facsimile of a firearm. To
hold otherwise would pervert the language of section 76-6-302 and
erode the statutory distinction between robbery and aggravated
robbery." Id. at 965. However, since the Suniville decision,
the Utah Legislature amended the aggravated robbery statute to
include not only a "facsimile" but also a "representation" of
"any item capable of causing death or serious bodily injury."
Utah Code Ann. § 76-1-601(5)(a),(b) (2004).
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ADDENDUM D

76-6-302. Aggravated robbery,
(1) A person commits aggravated robbery if in the course of committing
robbery, he:
(a) uses or threatens to use a dangerous weapon as defined in Section
76-1-601;
(b) causes serious bodily injury upon another; or
(c) takes or attempts to take an operable motor vehicle.
(2) Aggravated robbery is a first degree felony
(3) For the purposes of this part, an act shall be considered to be "in the
course of committing a robbery" if it occurs in an attempt to commit, during the
commission of, or in the immediate flight after the attempt or commission of a
robbery.

76-1-601. Definitions.
Unless otherwise provided, the following terms apply to this title:
(5) "Dangerous weapon" means:
(a) any item capable of causing death or serious bodily injury; or
(b) a facsimile or representation of the item; and:
(i) the actor's use or apparent intended use of the item leads
the victim to reasonably believe the item is likely to cause death
or serious bodily injury; or
(ii) the actor represents to the victim verbally or in any other
manner that he is in control of such an item.

